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THE CHANGING ENVIRONMENT OF 
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THE SHORTAGE FACTOR 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the wonders in Mr. Ripley's catalogue of the strange occur-
rences of nature is a peculiar "tree" which lives even now on a wind-
swept plateau high in the Andes. Unlike most trees, which in their 
growing process choke out all other sizable growth within a certain ra-
dius of their trunks, this "tree" is actually formed from the side-by-side 
growth of two trees: one leaf-bearing, and one fir. The result is what 
appears to be a single tree, but one of distinctly different character 
depending upon the side which is viewed. While there can be no doubt 
as to the separate ancestry of each, the meshed root system, the parallel 
trunks and the entwined branches combine to create a vital identity 
which is more real than apparent. It is impossible to truly know one 
without knowing the other. 
Too often, practitioners of the law fail to appreciate the close rela-
tionship which the law shares with economic forces. This is true despite 
the fact that these forces operate upon the same society as does the law, 
and despite the fact that the nature and scope of the law are to a great 
extent themselves a function of these economic forces. Too often it is 
considered enough to ascertain what the reporter has included under 
the appropriate headnote in the statute book, regulation pamphlet or 
advance sheet. Arguably, in some areas of legal practice such an atti-
tude is equal to the task at hand due to the pedestrian nature of the 
subject matter. 
Such is not the case in the area which has come to be known as 
international commercial law. Here, the dynamics of world economics 
play a key role in the constant evolution and episodic revolution of the 
law. 
It is the purpose of this comment to focus upon those factors which 
have had significant impact upon transnational trade within the past 
several months, 1 and which are likely to affect further developments in 
the months to come. To that end, this study2 integrates economic3 fac-
tors with those which, in a more orthodox sense, are purely legal. 
1. This comment focuses primarily upon the time period October 1973 through late 
March 1974, although it frequently touches upon previous events and contemplates future 
developments. 
2. This comment employs a topical approach. While certain topics bearing upon or 
influenced by economic shortages (such as inflation) are not treated directly, they have 
been weighed and factored into those topics which are presented. 
3. Political factors are also considered where appropriate. 
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I. WORLD ECONOMIC SHORTAGES 
Certainly the linchpin of all developments bearing upon transna-
tional trade during the past quarter has been economic shortage. One 
such shortage, that of fossil fuel, and specifically crude ·oil, has seem-
ingly eclipsed the others. However, there is a broad range of commodi-
ties or "real" goods for which there is currently an international seller's 
market. This has resulted from the uncoordinated interaction of a num-
ber of factors, only a portion of which are political in nature. This 
section deals with shortages in general, and focuses upon oil. It analyzes 
the impact of such shortages upon various countries and types of coun-
tries, both exporting and importing, the relatively undeveloped as well 
as the industrialized. It highlights the resultant changes in trade rela-
tions and bargaining positions; considers the various diplomatic initia-
tives which have been pursued in an effort to stabilize world trade; and 
finally, examines the most sophisticated means yet employed in the 
classic and ongoing attempt to read the palm of the "invisible hand" at 
work in the market place. In this case the forum is the world. Each finger 
twitch has a potentially great significance for international commercial 
law. 
A. The Shortage of Oil 
1. GENERALLY 
The shortage of oil in the United States and most other Western 
industrialized countries4 during the period of the Arab embargo5 and 
production cutback6 must be seen in perspective. While the move was 
4. Canada occupies a unique position among western industrialized nations. While 
it imports oil to service its eastern provinces, it is , on balance, an oil exporting country. 
As with all other countries, however, the price of oil rose sharply in Canada. Thus, despite 
its seemingly privileged position as an exporter, its industry was still seriously affected 
by those higher prices. 
5. The embargo extended from October 16, 1973 through March 18, 1974. On the 
latter date, seven of the nine Arab countries which had imposed controls upon the sale of 
their oil lifted that portion of those controls which forbade export to the United States. 
The embargo was left in effect with regard to the Netherlands. The seven nations termi-
nating the ban on March 18 were: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, Qatar, Bahrain, 
Egypt and Algeria. The two continuing the ban were Syria and Libya. Syrian oil exports 
are of minimal importance. However, Libya had shipped an average of 205,000 barrels per 
day to the United States prior to the embargo. N .Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 20, col. 3. 
6. From a global point of view the far more serious component of the Arab actions 
was the production cutback. In November 1973 it amounted to 25% of former output, thus 
taking five million barrels per day off the world market. In December, the reduction was 
relaxed when it was concluded that most Western European countries, the United King-
dom and Japan had sufficiently altered their foreign policy with respect to Israel. At that 
point, most African and Asian nations were allotted increased supplies. N.Y. Times, Mar, 
19, 1974, at 20, col. 4. 
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unprecedented, it was not entirely unforeseeable. Well prior to the em-
bargo, the rising demand for oil and oil derivative products, coupled 
with the rapid depletion in traditional sources of supply, resulted in 
increased price-setting leverage· for alF oil exporters. Those of the Mid-
dle East were certainly no exception. In the two and one half years 
immediately preceding the embargo, the Middle-East, oil-producing 
countries twice succeeded in efforts to renegotiate extraction royalties. 8 
Twice, they imposed what, at the time, were dramatically sharp in-
creases.n Thus, the cessation of the embargo and even the restoration of 
production to September 1973 levels 10 only removed a certain degree 11 
of intrigue from the petroleum commodity situation. The shortage is real 
and will continue.12 Two questions remain: what is its impact, and sec-
ondly, what is being done about it? 
7. Non-Arab exporters benefitting from the rise in price include five members of the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). They are: Iran, Venezuela, Ni-
geria, Indonesia and Equador. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 11, col. 1. 
8. The Persian Gulf states first demonstrated their collective market power at Te-
heran in 1971 when they forced the oil companies operating in their countries to agree to 
more than double the royalties they would pay during the next four years. In 1972, Saudi 
Arabia, Abu Dhabi and Qatar signed agreements under which the government share of 
ownership of the extracting firms would rise from 25% to 51 % by 1982. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, 
at 1540. 
9. Under the Teheran agreement of 1971 the producer countries' per barrel receipts 
had increased from $.80 which had been the prevailing rate in 1970, to $1.25 in 1971 and 
were scheduled to increase to $1.80 by 1985. Effective increases were still greater as a result 
of 1972 agreements reached in Rijadh under which the producer countries began to receive 
a percentage of production. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1213-14. 
10. By far the world's greatest exporter of crude oil, Saudi Arabia, was producing at 
the· rate of 8.3 million barrels per day in September 1973. At the time of the lifting of the 
embargo against the United States in March of this year it was estimated that daily 
production levels stood at 7.3 million barrels per day. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 1, 
col. 3. 
11. Ultimately the intrigue remains for the embargo could be reimposed either in 
whole or in part. Most of the Persian Gulf states are governed by absolute rulers. While 
these men are highly educated and concerned with long range plans which are dependent 
upon oil receipts, they are sufficiently secure in their positions and desires that a reimposi-
tion must not be dismissed as an impossibility. 
12. The question of how long the oil shortage will last has been widely debated and 
is beyond the scope of this comment. Additionally, as has been demonstrated, political 
factors make projections regarding oil supply problematical at best. However, it should 
be noted that plans do exist which, if carried out, would make Saudi Arabia the world's 
largest producer (surpassing the United States and the Soviet Union which currently rank 
first and second respectively). This would quickly end supply shortfall until alternate 
sources of energy such as nuclear, solar and geo-thermal were expanded to assume the bulk 
of the tasks now performed through the use of oil. Despite the cogent arguments for 
continued Arab supply controls it is perhaps significant that Saudi expansion programs 
continued throughout the embargo and production cutback. See, Farnsworth, Oil Output 
and Prices, N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 21, cols. 3-4. 
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2. IMPACT 
a. Net Oil Importing Countries 
The impact of the shortage upon net oil importing countries has 
been uniformly negative. However the degree of dislocation has varied 
widely, usually increasing with the extent to which a given country's 
economy depends upon imported oil. 13 The removal of the embargo did 
nothing to alter this fact. 
Japan provides an example. 14 Like all industrialized countries15 it 
has built and planned its economy largely upon presumptions of an 
abundant supply of inexpensive energy and raw materials. Primary 
among those assumptions was that there was, and would continue to be, 
abundant supplies of inexpensive petroleum. The assumption went one 
important step further, however; it was assumed that those supplies 
would not only continue to exist, but that they would continue to be 
made available. The distinction is as critical as it is subtle. While the 
oil certainly exists, rn in general 17 its owners have simply decided to re-
strict its flow toward the market. 111 
13. A recently published report indicated the following representative levels of de-
pendency upon imported oil as a percentage of total oil demand: United Kingdom, 98%; 
France, 95%; United States, 16%; The Netherlands and the Federal Republic of Germany, 
93%. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 36. 
In another report, using perhaps more current data, the "oil saving capacity" of 
several key international traders was computed. This index took into account two factors: 
the share of non-industrial use in total energy requirements, and the share of oil in total 
energy requirements. The study concluded that the countries rank as follows in order of 
increasing oil saving capacity: Japan, Italy, Belgium, France, United Kingdom, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Canada and the United States. IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974, at 5. 
14. The Japanese are quite aware of their vulnerability to supply cutback. They 
receive between 70% and 80% of their oil from the major oil companies, none of which is 
Japanese. In 1972, Japan depended on imports for 83.5% of its energy and close to 100% 
of its oil. Approximately 81% of that oil came from the Middle East. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, 
at 1544. 
15. This is also true of those countries whose economies are in the early stages of the 
industrialization process. 
16. See note 12 supra. See also NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1546. 
17. It should be kept in mind that not all oil exporting countries have engaged in 
production or export restrictions. See note 7 supra. 
18. Looking at the embargo from a totally apolitical perspective, at least one point 
becomes clear. The uses to which oil has traditionally been put are ultimately wasteful of 
a precious and highly versatile commodity. As the Shah of Iran noted in an English 
language television broadcast early this year, there is something perverse about burning 
oil to run an industrialized society indefinitely. He suggested the wisdom ofrapid conver-
sion to alternate energy sources so as to divert the world 's remaining oil stocks to the 
petrochemical industry which could then convert the crude into a variety of products for 
which there is a current and growing world demand. Such a sentiment, if acted upon , 
would have a two-edged effect upon international commerce. 
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Thus, a rather glaring discrepancy exists between the assumption 
of adequate, inexpensive and dependable oil supplies and the reality of 
deliberately created petroleum supply shortfall. The scramble for oil at 
almost any price 19 early this yea:r illustrates the difficulty of determining 
what constitutes "inexpensive" at any given moment. However, two 
observations can be made. 
The first is that a 300 to 400 percent increase20 in the price of any 
basic commodity so radically alters the cost of goods produced through 
its use, that they must find acceptance in a totally different marketplace 
from the one for which the industry was designed. It would be difficult 
to overstate the significance of these developments for industrialized 
society. At any time such a radical disruption of a key commodity price 
would create a vortex capable of wrecking an entire economy. 21 However, 
this unique transnational disruption comes at a time when (a) institu-
tions designed to coordinate, moderate, integrate and strengthen world 
economies are foundering in confusion and discord, 22 (b) a particularly 
virulent "stagflation"23 seems certain to frustrate merely national at-
tempts at recovery, and (c) nations, rather than growing independent 
of oil, will become increasingly dependent upon it. 24 
19. Prices last November were as high as $22 per barrel. By mid-March they had 
settled at $8 for the same quantity of the same grade. N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1974, at 45, 
col. 8. 
20. The possibility of such a wide difference in cost is merely reflective of the cur-
rently wide range of prices paid for Middle-Eastern crude oil. It should also be noted that 
qualitative factors still exist. 
21. The most serious domestic crisis of the Kennedy administration was the threat-
ened steel price hike and the events surrounding it. Steel, like oil, is a basic commodity. 
A rise in its price is reflected in ensuing months in the prices of goods manufactured 
through its use, a phenomenon known as the "ripple effect." Thus, from the standpoint 
of inflation, price increases in basic commodities are of the most virulent type. 
With regard to the interaction of commodity cost escalation and world currency 
inflation see generally: Wolman, lnfiation! It's Bad but Maybe Not Cataclysmic, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 10, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Mullaney, lnfiation, The No. 1 Foe, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 24, 1974, § 3, at 14, col. 1; Malabre, America First/US. lnfiation Now Exceeds 
Increase in Many Other Lands, Wall Street J., Mar. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 6; lNT'L CURRENCY 
REV., Nov./Dec. 1973, at 24-33. With regard to capital spending in light of this short-
age/inflation interaction, see. Golden, Capital-Spending Plans Gain/Energy Shortage Has 
Been Spur, N.Y. Times, Mar. 1, 1974, at 35, col. 1. 
22. The recent history of both the International Montary Fund and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade has belied the existence of a genuine determination to 
deal effectively with such problems as world inflation, balance of payments distortions, 
currency realignment and unfair trade practices. This is not an institutional shortcoming, 
but rather the lack of sincere input on the part of the governments constituting the bodies. 
23. This is the name which has been attached to a situation which combines a 
generalized slowdown in economic growth with declining purchasing value of currency. 
See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 53, col. 5. 
24. Although the United States now imports only 16% of its oil from the Middle East, 
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The second observation flows directly from the first. A kind of dom-
ino effect is at work in the international trade arena. It is a bewildering 
system which has never really been charted, 25 but its basic logic can be 
rather easily understood. The price of a vital commodity, oil, has in-
creased, not moderately but rapidly. Old markets traded goods made 
with and from 26 oil at the old, radically lower price. The old market did 
reasonably well. It should have, for it evolved rather slowly and adjusted 
more or less obediently to events. Now, that old market is being asked 
to trade the far more expensive goods made with and from the far more 
expensive oil; and to an extent which may prove surprising, it will do 
so. However, the real question is not whether or not the market will 
adapt, but rather, how it ought to adapt so as to minimize dislocations. 
In so phrasing the question, the issue becomes one of structures, tech-
niques and mechanisms-the tools of the international trader and the 
province of the international commercial lawyer. 
There is another dimension to the generalized plight of the net oil 
importing countries. That is the jolting trauma sustained by the econ-
omies of the world's developing nations. The majority of Latin Amer-
ica, 27 the newly formed Caribbean Community,28 vast stretches of Af-
rica2!1 and the Asian subcontinent30 have all suffered recent economic 
reversals. Among the chief causes has been the inability to acquire inex-
pensive oil. While the nature of the problem is essentially the same as 
for the industrialized countries (untenable price and supply assump-
tions), the operational effect has not been merely dislocation, but trag-
edy. 
Lastly, two European nations, the United Kingdom31 and Italy, 32 
which had been making progress toward stronger economies have seen 
these trends reversed due largely to oil and oil-related matters. 
b. Net Oil Exporting Countries 
There were two major achievements of the net oil exporting coun-
it may depend on those areas for as much as 40% of its oil by 1980. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, 
at 1540. 
25. But see notes 76-79 infra and accompanying text . 
26. The phrase "with and from" is used advisedly since oil is used extensively both 
as a constituent raw material of the petrochemical industry and as the driving force of 
the internal combustion engine. 
27 . Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Surinam, Uruguay and Paraguay must all import oil. 
Columbia will soon become a net oil importer. N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 4, at 29, col. 
3. 
28. Id., Feb . 18, 1974, at 42, col. 1. 
29. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, § 1, at 20, col. 6. 
30. Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 52, col. 4. 
31. Id., Mar. 14, 1974, at 57, col. 2. 
32. Id., Feb. 19, 1974, at 47, col. 6. 
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tries during the past quarter: they succeeded in dramatically increasing 
their revenues, 3:J and OPEC became a household word. Both are the 
direct result of a consciously and tenaciously pursued policy, and while 
both will benefit the exporters in diverse ways, they each harbor a poten-
tial danger for these countries. While these currently appear only as 
scattered clouds on an otherwise glorious horizon, they may prove signif-
icant in the months to come. 
Initially, the exporters are faced with the deceptively difficult prob-
lem of proper resource allocation. For some, 34 internal investment will 
require all or most of these funds. For these, the options are straightfor-
ward and the decision-making process should proceed along classical 
lines. For others:i5 however, the problem is far more complex. There is 
no reason to believe that inflation and other shocks from the interna-
tional monetary cross-current will somehow bypass these countries. 
Thus, "economic rent maximization"36 becomes crucial. This task be-
comes all the more complex in light of the reportedly ultra-conservative 
investment attitude of the Arab. 37 
Secondly, the heightened notoriety of OPEC would seem to restrict 
the range of concerted actions which the group can seriously consider 
in the future. Divisions in economic goals and political allegiance divide 
the group,:111 and internally inconsistent trends are made all the more 
33. OPEC is expected to earn $100 billion this year from exports. Id., Mar. 16, 1974, 
at 11, col. 1. 
34. Algeria, Iraq, Indonesia, Egypt and Nigeria fall into this group. See id., Feb. 17, 
1974 § 4, at 3, col. 8. 
35. These would include Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Kuwait and 
Libya. 
36. In an attempt to make informed investment decisions, certain unspecified Arabs 
have reportedly solicited bids from major United States consulting concerns for a pricing 
study. The specific information they seek is the cost to industrialized nations of acquiring 
alternate energy sources. Once they are in receipt of this figure they can compute a price 
for oil which will in effect just undercut that switchover cost. This price would presumably 
guarantee a steady market for their oil and thus assure a steady, if fixed, income. With 
this income information, financial counselors will then be able to plot a comprehensive 
investment plan. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1974, at 45, col. 6. 
37. There have been clear indications from Saudi Arabia, by far the largest potential 
surplus earner, that it is more interested in joint venture investments at home and else-
where in the Middle East than in the United States. In response, several United States 
based companies are in various stages of planning joint ventures in Saudi Arabia. They 
include: Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp., Marconal Corp., Bechtel Corp., Dow 
Chemical Co., M. W. Kellogg Co., PPG Industries Inc., Houston Natural Gas Corp., Cal-
tex Petroleum Corp., Hercules Inc., General Motors Corp., United States Steel Corp., 
American Oil Co., W.R. Grace and Co., Mobil Oil Corp., Transcontinental Gas Pipeline 
Corp., E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., and Kidder, Peabody Co. Inc. 
Since there are no reporting requirements for foreign investments made in the United 
States, it is impossible to tell with certainty how much money the producing countries 
are investing in this country. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, 1215. 
38. Net importing countries will certainly be looking for ways in which they can 
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visible by the new-found notoriety.39 In the complex chemistry that is 
international affairs, this could well force a substantial change in the 
internal dynamics and external effectiveness of the Organization. 
c. Trade Relationships 
As the sections above indicate, the oil shortage per se (as distinct 
from any additional shortages caused by the embargo40) has had a 
marked impact upon trade relationships. However it is useful to risk 
blurring the distinction between the two, and to view the embargo 
shortage together with the shortage per se. For while distinct, their 
influences upon world trade relationships interacted for a period of five 
months. A certain phenomenon emerged from that interaction and has 
become discernible. It involves oil and is apparently limited to it at this 
time. However it is potentially applicable (at least in theory) to several 
other commodities. This phenomenon has come to be known as resource 
diplomacy. 
The underlying principle is simple and the motivation apparent. 
Following OPEC's example, countries producing key primary products 
band together, fix steep prices and keep supply at a level just below 
world demand. Thus, the theory goes, profits are maximized, national 
wealth redistributed from the relatively rich to the relatively poor and, 
in the process, a way is conveniently found for the primary goods produ-
cer to meet his recently increased oil bill. However, this theoretical 
scenario is oversimplified. Several specific conditions must be satisfied 
before the required united action can take place and before such action 
can bring about results. If such were not the case, the OPEC phenome-
non would be far more familiar than it currently is. First, such cartels 
must take advantage of demand that is relatively insensitive to price 
hikes. Secondly, substitute products cannot be readily available at 
better prices. Thirdly, large financial reserves and relative indepen-
subtly exploit these natural diffenmces. Even within the strictly Arab portion of OPEC 
there are sharp divisions. As one observer wrote recently, 
When Israel is not at issue, Saudis are contemptuous of everyone else, Syrians 
are outcasts, Iraqis are at odds with all their neighbors, and, in general, there is 
a wide variety of different opinions on any subject. Nor is there much love lost 
between Arab capitals when money is at stake, and that means oil. 
It must be noted that Iraq is not a member of OPEC, but the fact of a multifaceted rather 
than a monolithic OPEC structure becomes clear. N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1973, § 6 
(Magazine), at 98, col. 4. 
39. For example, the public disagreement displayed between Venezuelian Oil Minis-
ter, Valentin Hernandez and his Saudi counterpart, Sheikh Ahmed Zaki al-Yamani on 
March 16 over the question of a price reduction. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, at 13, col. 1. 
40. It is not at all certain what fraction of the gasoline shortage in the United States 
during the period of the embargo was, in fact, due to the embargo. 
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dence from short-run fortunes of the commodity in question are almost 
essential since they enable the producer to survive the foreseeable 
periods of limited output. Though less critical, two other factors are of 
considerable importance. Since such a scheme is essentially interna-
tional collusion, the fewer the producers and the fewer the rivalries 
among them, the greater will be the chances for success. Lastly, a 
powerful leader can be of decisive importance. 41 
In addition to OPEC, several other commodity cartels have been 
formed recently. The leading non-North American copper producers 
have formed CIPEC.42 While it is not at all clear which is cause and 
which is effect, the price of copper for nearby delivery nearly doubled 
during the last six months of last year. 43 In a similar move, seven nations 
producing a majority of the world's bauxite44 have formed the Interna-
tional Association of the Producers of Bauxite. 45 Meanwhile, the coffee 
cartel is so well established that its members allowed the once-
protective International Coffee Agreement to expire early last year. 46 
Possibilities for further producer initiatives exist in tin, natural rubber, 
timber, tea, cocoa and pepper. 47 
The outlook for producer cartels is not, however, as bearish as it 
might appear to be. While commodity prices are currently at record or 
near record highs, the cause of this (with the exception of oil) is not 
cartel pressure. Rather it is extraordinary world-wide economic expan-
sion. Secondly, to a certain extent these prices reflect a flight from 
depreciable currencies into real goods. 48 These factors do not directly 
bear upon the ability of producers to create effective cartels and impose 
sustained high prices. In and of themselves they certainly fail to make 
out a compelling case for a truly effective cartel. The political difficul-
ties inherent in such an attempt, as well as the diffuse nature of most 
primary goods, combine to weigh the odds heavily against success. For 
example, after careful consideration the bauxite group decided not to 
impose an embargo. Their rationale was simple: it was clear that con-
sumers would have shifted to alternate sources of supply. 49 
41. See generally Bergsten, The World May Have to Live with Shortages, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 4, at 3, col. 3. 
42. CIPEC stands for Conseil Intergouvernmental des Pays Exportateurs de Cuivre. 
Its members are: Chile, Peru, Zaire and Zambia. Id. 
43. Id. 
44. Bauxite is the ore from which alumina is extracted. It is alumina which is then 
processed into aluminum. 
45. They are: Guinea, Australia, Guyana, Jamaica, Sierre Leona, Surinam and Yugo-
slavia. N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1974, at 55, col. 12. 
46. Id., Feb. 2, 1974, at 37, col. 1. 
47. See note 41 supra. 
48. See notes 115-17 infra and accompanying text. 
49. See note 45 supra. 
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While the next few months may well see the formation of producers' 
organizations in a number of commodity areas, there will not be a prolif-
eration of OPEC's; that is, there will be no mass movement toward true 
price-setting cartels. What appears far more likely are wide fluctuations 
in the real50 price of primacy goods as supply and demand conditions 
change. On balance, inflation, as well as genuine shortage and buyer 
confusion will combine to keep those fluctuations decidedly on the up-
ward course they are now traveling. 51 
Thus, while resource diplomacy is currently exerting only a fraction 
of its potential influence upon the market, two facts must be kept in 
mind with regard to it. The first is that there is currently no interna-
tional body effectively working to moderate the substantial dislocations 
in trade relationships which existing resource diplomacy has caused. 
The second fact to be kept in mind is that by 1985 the United States 
will have to import approximately one-half of all its essential raw mate-
rials.52 That is to say that it will be absolutely dependent upon them, 
and in a very real sense, upon the suppliers of them.53 
50. A real price is one which discounts inflation absolutely and thus concentrates 
solely upon constant value relative to other goods. 
51. Josefik, Sudden Sell-Off/But Infiation Still a Factor, Wall Street J., Mar. 8, 1974, 
at 1, col. 6 [hereinafter cited as Josefik]. 
52. Reston, Two Tanks in Every Tent, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1974, at 15, col. 1. 
53. One of the most noteworthy of all occurrences during the last quarter involves the 
suspension of all non-disbursed Export-Import Bank credits for proposed deals involving 
the Soviet Union, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. While the technicalities of the dis-
pute are themselves interesting, the key aspect of the suspension insofar as resource 
diplomacy is concerned is the subject matter of the specific deal which prompted the 
suspension. For over one year credits had been extended to Soviet-bloc countries under a 
very loose interpretation of the enabling legislation. While this was a matter of public 
record there had been no objections. However, when during the height of the energy frenzy 
credits were sought for a $49;5 million natural gas exploitation project in the Soviet Union, 
Senator Richard Schweiker goaded the General Accounting Office to enforce the rather 
explicit letter of the law. The G.A.O. ordered the suspension and an opinion from the 
Attorney General is currently pending. In explaining his action Senator Schweiker made 
reference to a potential of $6.1 billion in Export-Import Bank credits, 
I can't conceive of how any President could make the determination now that 
exporting $6.1 billion of American capital for energy development in the Soviet 
Union would be in the national interest. 
The clear implication is that if the money is to be spent, it should be invested in a country 
where the long-range political climate offers some substantial assurance of uninterrupted 
supply to the United States. Id. Mar. 22, 1974, at 55, col. 7; id., Mar. 12, 1974, at 54, col. 
3. 
In pertinent part the statute of the Export-Import Bank reads as follows: 
(2) The bank in the exercise of its functions shall not guarantee, insure or 
extend credit, or participate in any extension of credit-
(A) in connection with the purchase or lease of any product by a Commu-
nist country ... , or agency or national thereof, ... except that the prohibi-
tions contained in this paragraph shall not apply in the case of any transaction 
11
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3. INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPTS TO DEAL WITH THE SHORTAGE OF OIL 
a. Governmental 
From the foregoing sections it becomes clear that the existing struc-
ture of international trade and the organizations charged with regulat-
ing and facilitating it have failed to keep pace with the needs of the 
international trading community. This section focuses upon recent at-
tempts by Western industrialized society to deal with the oil shortage 
and its impact upon the world economy. 
Essentially two types of attempts have been made. They differ 
radically, both conceptually, and in operation and effect. The first, 
proposed and practiced by the French, is the ancient doctrine of "sauve 
qui peut" or, roughly, "every man for himself." It results in bilateral-
ism.51 The second, proposed by the United States, involves multilateral-
ism"" and interdependence. This interdependence extends not only to 
the economies of industrialized nations but to the broad range of inter-
national occurrences affecting them. 56 
The French position is easily understood. During the embargo many 
nations had engaged in what at times appeared to be a mad rush to buy 
oil for short and mid-range delivery, at almost any price.57 As the mid-
February, Washington energy conference was convened, such unilateral 
action was the rule rather than the exception. Indeed, at the conference 
French Foreign Minister Michel Jobert cited a published report of seven 
countries then attempting to conclude bilateral contracts with oil pro-
ducers.58 When he characterized the list as incomplete, no one chal-
lenged the truth of his statement. 
which the President determines would be in the national interest if he reports 
that determination to the Senate and the House of Representatives within thirty 
days after making the same. 
Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 § 2(b)(3), Pub. L. No. 90-267, § l(c), 82 Stat. 47 as 
amended, 12 U.S.C .A. § 635(b)(2), as amended, (Supp. 1972). 
The nub of the legal controversy is whether or not the President has the statutory 
authority to classify trade with a designated "Communist" country as being per se in the 
national interest, or if he rather is required to make an individualized finding for each 
proposed project and present those findings to the Congress in cases where he does find 
trade to be in the national interest. 
54. Bilateralism: so called because unilateral buyer action results in bilateral con-
tracts. 
55. Multilateralism: so called because the buyers present the sellers with a united 
group. The resulting contract is thus common to all the buyers, or multilateral. 
56. Chief among these have been strategic considerations. Silk, Energy Talks: Why 
the U.S. Position Won, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1974, at 43, col. 3 [hereinafter cited as U.S. 
Position]. 
57. See note 19 supra. 
58. U.S. Position, supra note 56, at 43, col. 1. 
12
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It was not until this conference that the several aspects of the Amer-
ican position on multilateralism were thoroughly integrated and clearly 
presented to the industrialized West. At the heart of the American 
strategy was (and is) the proposition that in the long run the price of 
oil will be lower than it fs now-at least in "real" terms. Secretary of 
State Kissinger presented a seven point proposal embodying the Ameri-
can multilateral position.59 The first three points ·bore directly upon the 
realization of a lower oil price through conservation60 and the develop-
ment of alternate energy sources. The fourth point advocated a system 
of energy sharing61 which, in addition to mitigating the effects of an 
embargo, contains the potential for helping reduce disorder in the hy:-
persensitive international oil market. 62 The last three points were di-
rected at institution building, with regard to both producer/consumer 
relations and also the vital area of oil revenue recycling. 63 
The American position was couched in the economic philosophy 
known as Pareto-optimality;64 optimum economic efficiency is achieved 
when no one can be made better off without making someone else worse 
off. Secretary Kissinger suggested that the aim of all nations should be 
to achieve this optimality on an international scale, and that multilater-
alism was the proper means to that end. The American position was 
accepted over the vigorous objections and dissensions of the French· 
ministers. 
From a purely tactical standpoint, the United States succeeded 
because of two key characteristics in its approach and one very impor-
tant fact of life. It established realistic goals which were widely accept-
able and which genuinely served the interests of the joint community. 
Secondly, it subtly but decidedly linked economic and security mat-
ters. 65 Lastly, the strengthening American economic position, its sub-
59. Id., at 53, col. 3. 
60. Mr. Kissinger spoke in terms of a "new energy ethic". Id. 
61. Id., col. 4. There is a certain anomoly in the United States calling for a system of 
sharing. As of the fall of 1973 the United States government had no stockpiles of oil and 
no policy on stockpiles of oil. Most other major industrialized countries did. While the 
amount of the stockpiles varied, they averaged around the sixty day level. Traditionally, 
attempts at reaching sharing agreements have been thwarted by a fundamental split over 
whether a sharing program should apply only to imported oil or to imported oil and 
domestic oil both. NAT'L J. REP., 1973, at 1547. 
62. Uncertainty over supply is perhaps the chief factor behind inflationary beggar-
thy-neighbor runs on a commodity. To the extent that such an assured supply would limit 
uncertainty, it would help stabilize the market by its sheer presence. 
63. The periods when the world's monetary systems have worked well were when 
surplus countries invested their surpluses overseas. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, 
at 34. 
64. Vilfredo Pareto (1848-1923); Italian economist. Silk, Kissinger as Economist, 
N .Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1974, at 53, col. 7. 
65. U.S. Position, supra note 56, at 43, col. 3. The Europeans in general and the 
13
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stantial energy supplies, 66 its premiere technological capability and its 
unparalleled capital market, 67 all combined to form a pillar of compara-
tive certainty toward which the other nations were attracted at a time 
of great confusion.68 
The thirteen nations participating in the conference issued a joint 
communique at its conclusion. 69 In it they proposed that they monitor 
oil related problems through their participation _in existing international 
organizations such a~ the OECD70 and the IMF71 when the nature of the 
problems were such that this method was possible. In addition, it agreed 
to the formation of temporary working groups on projects for which there 
were no other suitable bodies.72 
Since the conclusion of the conference, the United States has con-
tinued to advocate multilateralism and the French have been actively 
engaged (along with an indeterminate number of other countries) in 
bilateral efforts to secure oil. Although neither party admits it, 73 there 
Germans in particular are very sensitive to the issue of continued United States military 
presence. Well aware of this, and eager to proceed on the economic front, President Nixon 
made a point of saying the following at a recent news conference. 
In the event that Congress gets the idea that we are going to be faced with 
economic confrontation and hostility from the Nine, you will find it almost 
impossible to get Congressional support for continued American presence at 
present levels on the security front. 
N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 4, col. 4. 
66. As noted above, the United States is currently the world's greatest producer of 
oil. See note 12 supra. In addition, the United States has the world's greatest coal reserve 
and it possesses advanced nuclear technology. 
67. N.Y. Times, Feb. 18, 1974, at 39, col. 7. 
68. The very fact of a fully synthesized and logically presented proposal was in itself 
a serious factor weighing in favor of its adoption. 
69. Succeeding on a procedural point, France was permitted to register dissent in the 
document. This was acceptable to the United States since it was official policy to do 
everything possible not to unduly alienate the French whose co-operation is needed if the 
NA TO and EEC documents on new structures of unity between the United States and 
Europe are to be completed. 
70. OCED, or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, is a 
United Nations affiliated group of 24 countries. The purpose of the group is to jointly 
explore matters of international economic significance. To that end it engages in research, 
serves as a forum for economic debate and periodically publishes studies of current inter-
national economic developments. Its members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974, at 1, col. 
3. 
71. See note 133 infra and accompanying text. 
72. No additional information was forthcoming on what these topics might be. It is 
difficult to conceive of a topic over which neither the IMF nor the OECD would have 
subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, if these temporary working groups are convened it will 
most likely be for convenience purposes. 
73. As for American desires for calm, see note 69 supra. As for the French, M. Jacques 
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is a very real confrontation in progress. 74 Oil is vital and that fact renders 
critical policies affecting the supply of oil. However, the outcome has a 
significance extending even beyond oil. The decision of the international 
community with respect to oil, and whether to act alone or in concert 
in attempts to secure it, will set a weighty precedent which is of the 
greatest importance in view of projected supply shortfalls. 
b. Institutional 
Governmental attempts to build an international framework for 
dealing with the impact of commodity shortages upon trade relation-
ships are not completely alone. This framework, if indeed it is ever 
realized, will necessitate goals and institutionalized means for attaining 
them. The determination of precise goals will itself pose a knotty prob-
lem for an international community of such a diverse nature. 75 Assum-
ing, however, that specific goals can be agreed upon, there remains the 
second hurdle of the institutionalized means for attaining them. There 
is nothing inherent within even the finest institution which guarantees 
its success. Success depends rather upon two factors: the willingness of 
the participants to work together to realize that success, and, equally 
as important, the ability to effectively act upon that community will. 
In the realm of international trade, that ability requires a body of 
knowledge never before amassed: the precise mechanics of international 
commerce, including the impact of commodity shortage upon it. A 
unique international entity has been formed for the purpose of acquiring 
this knowledge. It is a hybrid of governmentaF6 and international co-
operation with what are essentially private institutions, primarily uni-
versities and institutes. Based at the Wharton School of the University 
of Pennsylvania, the project, known as Link, continuously coordinates 
economic data on the foreign trade sectors of individual countries. 77 
Kosciusko-Morizet, the Ambassador to the United States was recently quoted as saying, 
"I do not see this crisis. I do not see the slightest sign of hostility or confrontation." N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 18, 1974, at 5, col. 1. 
74. On March 16, it was reported that during the preceding month American oil 
companies had sold, or dumped, two million tons of crude onto European markets at 
prices substantially below the $10.50 per barrel which the French had locked themselves 
into in a bilateral purchasing agreement with an Arab source. It was an obvious attempt 
to dissuade consumers from entering into long term arrangements with the Arabs at 
current price levels. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, at 1, col. 8. 
75. Once the decision has been made to pursue Pareto-optimality the hard question 
becomes the quantification of "goods." Even in good faith, countries are certain to differ 
sharply due to cultural predilections as well as more partisan factors. 
76. The project is financed by the Social Science Research Council, the National 
Science Foundation and the IMF. Golden, Linking Up the World Energy Crisis, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 27, 1974, § 3, at 1, col. 3. 
77. Link utilizes what is known as econometric model building and proceeds to mar-
15
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In contrast to the actual working of the system, which is reportedly 
the most sophisticated in the world, the theory behind it is clearcut. 
Assuming that the world economy is shaped by the interaction of a 
variety of factors and does not simply evolve, it is assumed that these 
factors must exert varying and specific impacts upon the overall sys-
tem. Starting with quite simple observations, these factors are then 
quantified, different weights being assigned to each factor. The weights 
are dynamic, that is , they are subject to change in any given analysis, 
depending upon the other factors which the project directors78 feel are 
involved in the real-world situation which the analysis is attempting to 
emulate. In this fashion the experience of history is brought to bear upon 
the convoluted calculus of contemporary trade problems. 
During the past quarter, Link directors were among the first to 
conclude that the effect of the oil embargo would primarily be higher 
prices and not an economic slowdown due to inability to acquire oil. The 
result has been an impressive short-run record. If this reliability contin-
ues to improve,79 it will mark a watershed not only in the development 
of a more orderly pattern of international commerce, but in economic 
history as a whole. 
On a more mundane level, the system has a significance which 
transcends the obvious forecasting value for the international entre-
preneur. Combined with the multilateral or interdependent approach to 
world petroleum shortage adopted in principle at the Washington en-
ergy conference, it could become a valuable tool with which to defuse 
future commodity crises. 
B. The Shortage of Food 
1. SCOPE 
A trend has developed within the past several months which threat-
ens to aggravate the world's perennial food shortage.80 While it is not yet 
ket projections by means of the simultaneous solution of a great number of equations. The 
whole complex system is held together by the simple notion that total world exports must 
equal total world imports. Id., at 4, cols. 4-8. 
78. The system is under the direction of Prof. Lawrence Klein and is supervised on a 
day to day basis by an economist, Keith Johnson. 
79. Accuracy should continue to improve since with each computer run the system 
learns more about how various market factors interact. This knowledge is retained through 
constant updating of the master program against which all new data is evaluated. 
80. There is a certain perversity in referring to a food shortage and limiting discussion 
to its effects upon international commerce. It is currently estimated that one and one-half 
billion persons are malnourished to the point of being physically underdeveloped and an 
additional five hundred million are believed to be starving to death. N.Y. Times, Mar. 
15, 1974, at 28, col. 4. 
While industrialized countries are only now beginning to feel the effects of the world 
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clear, it may affect consumers in industrialized nations who have tradi-
tionally been insulated from such concerns. 81 
Two conceptualizations of the nature and probable impact of the 
trend are currently being aired. The first is typified by the official policy 
of the United States government. It acknowledges a "current food gap" 
but suggests that this could well be followed by a "food glut". 82 While 
sympathizing with the need for stockpiles, it concludes that the long-
range situation will mirror what it sees as the experience of the last 
several decades-generally adequate supplies punctuated with occa-
sional shortages.83 The opposing view draws a sharper focus upon the 
current shortage, upon what it sees as a generalized private and govern-
mental insensitivity to the problem, and upon an ominous shift in world 
weather patterns. 84 Its conclusion is pessimistic. 
The government has relied heavily upon statistics from the Depart-
ment of Agriculture which recently indicated that farmers were pressing 
ahead with plans for a sharp expansion in crop acreage for summer 1974 
harvesting. In view of assurances of adequate fertilizer, Department 
economists reaffirmed their earlier predictions of record plantings in 
major grains. 85 However, even in view of the markedly greater acreage 
in use, the official projection was for "ample" food supplies, 86 not the 
substantial surplus which would be necessary for stockpiling.87 
food shortage, the economies of a large group of nations are suffering far more seriously. 
The agriculture of certain regions of South America, the Sahel region in Africa south of 
the Sahara, and the entire Asian sub-continent has been devastated by drought and 
drought/flood cycles. The Guyanan rice and sugar crops have been destroyed. Chad, an 
area which only thirty years ago exported grain, is now a virtual wasteland and the cattle 
of the Taureg and the Peul are dead and the people near starvation. Nigeria, Cameroun, 
Dahomey, Togo, Ghana and the Ivory Coast have seen their peanut, cocoa and coffee crop 
yields plunge drastically. In addition to this climate-caused disaster the hopes of all these 
countries have recently received another setback. At the very time that they required 
increased crop yield, the fertilizer through which such yields could possibly have been 
achieved became too expensive to afford. Most fertilizers used in large-scale agriculture 
are synthetic and petroleum based. The recent price hikes have not spared the third world. 
81. One of the effects has already been felt. Food cost at the retail level is at a record 
high and threatens to go higher still. The other effect could be a change in the interna-
tional political climate. See note 97 infra. 
82. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 39, col. 4. 
83. Id. 
84. See generally Alexander, The Ominous Shift in Weather Patterns, FORTUNE, Feb., 
1974, at 90. 
85. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 37, col. 1. 
86. Id. 
87. The world's stockpile of food grains is extremely thin. The 178 million bushels in 
the United States along with several hundred million in Canada and some additional 
wheat in a few other industrialized countries constitute the total world supply of grain. It 
is probable that aggregate world holdings of grains at the end of the current crop year this 
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In rejoinder, spokesmen for those who foresee a far less secure sup-
ply situation in the months ahead take issue not with the accuracy of 
the government's data, but rather with its significance and interpreta-
tion. They see the corn and wheat acreage rises as largely a function of 
two negative factors. The first is that American cattle herds, tradition-
ally an integral part of United States protein supply, are currently far 
below normal size. This has obviated the need for much of the sorghum 
which would normally be used as feed. A good deal of the sorghum 
acreage has consequently been shifted to wheat production. Thus, a 
substantial portion of the enlarged wheat planting is accounted for at 
the ultimate expense of meat protein. A second factor contributing to 
the projected wheat increase, it is said, is the utilization of marginal 
land, which cannot be seriously relied upon to produce in the amounts 
that government analysts predict. 88 Additionally, these critics point out 
that the government estimates are based upon assumptions of optimal 
growing conditions. This is especially true for winter wheat for which 
optimal conditions include the moisture it receives from melting snow-
cover in the spring. Broad areas of the American wheat belt were free 
of snow throughout much of the 1973-74 winter, 89 due perhaps to a shift 
in the path of moisture-bearing winds. 90 It is not now known if the rain 
which was deposited during early March91 was in sufficient amount to 
offset the lack of thaw moisture. It is thus impossible to determine at 
this time the precise scope of the projected shortage, or if there will 
indeed be a shortage of crisis proportion. 
Regardless of which projection for the 197 4 harvest proves more 
accurate it is undisputed that current United States grain carryover is 
the lowest in 27 years. 92 As a result of this, and looking to the various 
demands upon that supply, one trade association recently estimated 
that the United States would experience a grain shortfall of nearly one 
million bushels during the current year.93 While this too is disputed by 
Agriculture Department officials,94 it becomes clear that if the United 
States does have enough grain to meet all its commitments during the 
coming year it will be by only a slim margin. If the harvest is at all below 
official estimates, shortfall is virtually assured since carryover will have 
been taxed to its limit in meeting current demands.96 
88. Id., Mar. 15, 1974, at 43, col. 2. 
89. Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 58, col. 5. 
90. See note 84 supra. 
91. Wall Street J., Mar. 12, 1974, at 32, col. 2. 
92. Kneeland, Wheat Stocks Depleted, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 20, col.. 2. 
93. Id., at col. 3. 
94. See note 85 supra. 
95. See note 92 supra. 
96. Demand is loosely categorized as follows: foreign sector (exports of all types), 
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2. SIGNIFICANCE 
Insofar as international commerce is concerned, however, occur-
rence or non-occurrence of a food shortage in the United States during 
the current year is of only secondary importance to another fact. That 
fact is the existence of a bona fide shortfall threat, and the impact which 
that threat is exerting97 upon the trade policies of the international 
community . 
The question confronting the international trading community is 
whether the United States (or other net exporters finding themselves in 
a similar shortfall situation98 ) would make the political decision to inter-
fere with the flow of grain in the international market. Certainly the 
power to do so exists99 and parochial pressure to restrict exports would 
be enormous. 100 Further, the threat is by no means purely theoretical. 
There is sufficient recent precedent to make the threat of interference 
through export controls very real. 101 
3. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Currently North American agribusiness is heavily involved in sell-
ing grain to foreign markets. During the last several years these sales 
have become routine and foreign governments have come to rely upon 
a ready source of supply in either the United States or Canada. 102 Until 
home market (in-country sales of all types). Not all grain retained after exports is home 
market, however. A large portion of each year's crop must be recommitted to the earth as 
seed. Additional portions are used as cattle feed. 
97. The present tense is used advisedly. As is apparent from the tone of this section, 
the major consequences of any shortfall are prospective insofar as further price increases 
and consumer hardship are concerned. However, the impact of a possible shortage is 
currently being felt by political and trade relationships. The philosophy of Agriculture 
Secretary Butz is that if Americans are to trade in a free world market they must pay the 
going price for products, even those that are raised in great surplus at home. Undoubtedly, 
there are those who will disagree. See Kneeland, Consumers in U.S. Face Competition For 
Nation 's Food, N .Y. Times, Mar. 11, 1974, at 46, col. 4. 
98. Controls need not necessarily be governmental. Despite a heavy increase in Cana-
dian wheat production last year farmers have generally refrained from delivering it to 
elevators for sale. Id., Feb. 19, 1974, at 47, col. 7. 
99. State sovereignty recognized by international law would include such action. 
Further, international law at least arguably recogtiizes a government's obligation to pro-
vide for the welfare of its citizens even to the point of abrogating trade agreements or 
customs. S ee RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 153 
(1965). 
100. People the world over feel a special interest in food grown within the borders of 
their country. Psychologically, the line between interest and preemptive right is easily 
crossed. 
101. On June 27, 1973 the Commerce Department imposed an embargo upon the 
export of cottonseed oils and soybeans. On July 5 it imposed export controls upon 41 
categories of agricultural commodities. Soybeans and cottonseed oils were included among 
these 41, none of which could be exported from the United States without a validated 
license. These restrictions remained in force until September 7. NAT'L J. REP. , 1973, at 
1034, 1046. 
102. N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1974, at 39, col. 4. 
19
Huguet: Recent Developments
Published by SURFACE, 1974
1974] Recent Developments 139 
recently this situation was welcomed, especially by the United States. 
During the late sixties and early seventies grain sales provided a 
substantial portion of the revenue inflow that held the United States 
balance of payments deficit within acceptable limits. More recently, 
due to the celebrated 1972 Soviet wheat deal, 103 it even made possible 
the first United States trade surplus in several years. However, faced 
with a general rise in world demandrn4 and strong America-first domestic 
pressure, 105 the Nixon administration has made it clear that it no longer 
wishes to be looked to for assured supplies. 106 Simultaneously, the ad-
ministration has relaxed a number of legal impediments to the importa-
tion of food 107 and quietly appropriated substantial funds for crash re-
search and development programs so as to increase grain and protein 
supply. 108 
The Soviet Union, enjoying record harvests, 109 has consented to 
defer delivery of scheduled United States wheat shipments. 110 It has, 
however, deemed it prudent to commit $44 billion over five years to the 
agricultural development of vast tracts of currently marginal Siberian 
land. 111 
4. OUTLOOK 
While not yet at a crisis stage, the once assured position of indus-
trialized nations with respect to food has been seriously called into 
question. For the first time, it is being asked whether some entity other 
than the naked force of supply and demand has the responsibility for 
establishing a world grain stockpile, 112 and an international policy to 
103. In an interesting sidelight to the question of the shortage of food, the G.A.O. 
officially announced on February 12 that it could find no evidence of any wrongdoing 
within the Department of Agriculture with respect to the October 1972 wheat sales to the 
Soviet Union. Id., Feb. 13, 1974, at 55, col. 2. 
104. See note 81 supra. 
105. This faction has been led in recent months by the American Baker's Association. 
N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 1, col. 6. 
106. See note 82 supra. 
107. By proclamation the President suspended limitations on the importation of 
wheat and milled wheat products (39 Fed. Reg. 3533 (1974)) and meat (39 Fed. Reg. 7777 
(1974)). Further, he augmented the amount of cheddar cheese which could come into the 
country without import license by 100,000,000 pounds (39 Fed. Reg. 959 (1974)). 
108. On January 29 the Department of Agriculture placed a notice in the Federal 
Register soliciting research proposals involving genetic work with the soybean. Funding 
was to be in the maximum amount of $400,000; work to be completed within five years. 
39 Fed. Reg. 3700 (1974) . 
109. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974, at 6, col. 6. 
110. Id., Feb. 26, 1974, at 20, col. 6. The amount deferred was reportedly 37 million 
bushels. 
111. N.Y. Times, Mar. 16, 1974 at 6, col. 4. 
112. N.Y. Times, Feb. 24, 1974, § 3 at 12, col. 3. 
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regulate it. In view of the lethargy which characterizes all international 
initiatives, the answer to that question will evolve quite slowly. It will 
be influenced by factors bearing no relation to food allocation or nutri-
tional needs, other than that both questions will exist in the interna-
tional arena at the same period of time and expediency will dictate 
trade-offs. But an answer of sorts will evolve. Its specific nature will 
have a profound effect upon the manner in which international com-
merce in agricultural products is conducted, and consequently, upon the 
shape of international commercial law. 
C. Activity in Commodity Futures Markets 
1. NON-PRECIOUS METALS 
Motivated by developments in the supply situations of oil, food and 
other real goods, investors combined to exert unprecedented pressure on 
world commodity markets during the last quarter. While the net result 
upon the current price of almost all commodities purchased for future 
delivery113 was a drastic rise, analysts cautioned that sharp declines 
could be anticipated in at least some areas. 
Led by agricultural products, commodity prices reached generally 
high levels in the late summer of 1973. After falling off to a slight extent 
by early autumn, they again excelerated, spurred largely by two factors 
emanating from the Middle East: the October War and the subsequent 
oil boycott. This trend was continued and prices were driven even higher 
by a truck strike in the United States early in 1974. 114 
At this juncture the market became gripped by an unprecedented 
psychology. 115 Rather than being used as a mechanism through which 
producers and manufacturers could secure future raw material supply, 
the market became an investment medium pitting traditional buyers 
against speculators. In contrast to conventional practice, many purchas-
ers were not utilizing the market for the purpose of purchasing a specific 
commercial commodity. Rather, they were simply buying contracts for 
whatever goods had not already risen to their daily Hmits.1 16 The result 
113. The concept of purchasing a commodity for future delivery (hence the name 
"future") provides certainty for industries using basic goods. It also necessitates thorough 
knowledge of the supply/demand situation, not merely at the present, but at the hour of 
delivery. 
114. Josefik, supra note 51, at 1, col. 6. 
115. While commodity markets have traditionally been considered havens for specu-
lators against inflation, the degree to which the markets were subjected to this pressure 
during the last quarter was unprecedented. Rather than essentially alien forces whose 
impact was cushioned by the general market, these speculators seemed at times as though 
they had captured it. 
116. Most commodity markets have placed limits upon how much value an exchange 
unit of any given substance may gain or lose in a single session. The rationale for this 
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was a general and steep increase in prices. 117 
By the end of February, however, a variety of market factors began 
to exert themselves. Due to strong retail resistence to meat prices, the 
cost of livestock contracts began to fall. That single reversal seemed to 
spark a trend. Other factors combined in rapid succession to contribute 
to the reversal. These included: reports of an imminent cessation of the 
oil embargo; the decision of the Indian government to allow the sale of 
sterling for export; reports of renewed Peruvian anchovy fishing; 1111 and 
information indicating that both Argentina and Australia would soon 
resume substantial exports of sugar and grain. 119 
However, as could be expected, this trend was itselfreversed. Even 
as the oil embargo was in fact lifted in mid-March most futures ad-
vanced sharply on the rationale that the influx of higher-priced Arab 
crude would spur inflation. 120 The feeling was still apparently wide-
spread that the holding of a contract for a real good at a fixed dollar 
amount was the only safe investment. 
There has been sharp criticism of this investment psychology and 
its effects upon the commodity market. It is said that speculative inves-
tors (as distinguished from bona fide commodity tr~ders) exert an influ-
ence upon the market which compromises the traditional function of the 
exchange. Currently, commodity exchanges in the United States are 
largely self-regulating with only limited governmental surveillance. Fed-
eral legislation which would change that situation has proceeded rapidly 
through the House Agriculture Committee. 121 This legislation has been 
expedited by the speculative pressure which the exchanges have re-
cently experienced, and the impact which that pressure has had upon 
domestic and international commerce. 
2. PRECIOUS METALS GENERALLY 
Nowhere was this speculative pressure upon commodities more 
pronounced during the last quarter than in the world's precious metals 
markets. Gold, silver and platinum were all bid up to record highs. Gold 
blatant interference with market factors is that, in an imperfect world, this lends a note 
of stability to prices which would otherwise succumb to rumor and irrational forces. 
117. Soy, wheat, oats, corn, coffee, copper, cocoa and cotton were all at or near record 
highs . N .Y. Times, Feb. 26, 1974, at 58, col. 5. 
118. Id., Mar. 17, 1974, § 3, at 17, col. 1. 
119. Josefik, supra note 51, at 1, col. 6. 
120. N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1974, at 47, col. 5. 
121. The Bill calls for a five member commission, consisting of the Secretary of 
Agriculture and four public representatives. They would be invested with sweeping regula-
tory powers. Id., Feb. 28, 1974, at 54, col. 2. Elsewhere, similar sentiments were being 
expressed. Said one Assistant Agriculture Department Secretary in conjunction with un-
bridled speculation, "The days of wrist-slapping are gone." Josefik, supra note 51, at 16, 
col. 1. 
22
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 2, No. 1 [1974], Art. 8
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol2/iss1/8
142 Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com. [Vol. 2:121 
more than doubled in price in the twelve-month period ending February 
26 when it was traded on the London Bullion Market 122 at $184 per 
ounce, an increase of $60 since January l. 123 The same day, silver en-
joyed its eighteenth consecutive gaining session, fifteen of which were 
limit gains. 124 Because of the limitations on daily allowable price in-
creases platinum contracts virtually ceased to be traded; there being no 
sellers willing to part with it. 125 
By late March the markets had experienced a "shakeout" of some 
of the more emotional traders and gold had settled securely126 at the 
$160-$165 level, a price which was unthinkable less than one year be-
fore.121 
3. GOLD 
The behavior of the gold price reflects three factors: first, a substan-
tial decline in supplies of new gold oµtput and Russian sales; second, a 
persistently strong increase in demand for gold for uses in industry and 
the arts, as well as for investment, hedging and speculative purposes; 
and third, the growing belief that in conditions of world recession cou-
pled with inflation and compounded by the oil shortage, the govern-
ments of key countries will be forced to employ gold for their interna-
tional debt settlements at market-related prices. 128 This section ad-
dresses the first two of these factors. The third · is considered in the 
following section. 
While speculator pressure, both rational and irrational, was clearly 
the most remarkable factor influencing the unparalleled rise in gold 
prices, the primary cause for the rise went largely unnoticed by those 
not involved in the workings of the bullion market. It was, in fact, a 
simple case of supply outstripping demand; in effect, a gold shortage. 
The free world supply of market or "private sector" 129 gold fell by 
as much as 140, and by no fewer than 115, tons during 1973. Most of 
the reduction was accounted for by a six percent South African produc-
tion cutback and five and nine percent declines for Canada and the 
122. London, along with Zurich, and now Winnipeg constitute the three most impor-
tant bullion exchanges in the world. N.Y. Times, F;eb. 26, 1974, at 49, col. 6; id., Mar. 19, 
1974, at 53, col. 1. 
123. N.Y. Times, Feb. 27, 1974, at 1, col. 5. 
124. Id., at 49, col. 3. 
125. Id. 
126. It seemed secure in the sense of a stable floor, not a ceiling. 
127. Unthinkable for all but Mr. James Dines who has been telling the investment 
world for years that the day of gold was coming. Sample declaration, "Anyone who sells 
gold shares is an idiot." N.Y. Times, Mar. 10, 1974, § 3, at 7, col. 1. 
128. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 39. 
129. This is the gold used by artisans and industrialists and is distinct from the gold 
stored by governments in their central bank vaults. 
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United States respectively. While hard figures are impossible to se-
cure, 130 it seems certain that the Soviet Union sold substantially fewer 
tons in Zurich last year than it had in 1972. 131 
At the same time demand was rising. In the United States, gold 
usage in industry and the arts during the last half of 1973 increased by 
eight percent over the same period one year earlier. Percentage increases 
aside, the amount used was quite high in absolute terms, approximately 
240 tons. This represents an amount six times greater than the annual 
United States production yield. Thus, close to eighty percent of the 
private sector, United States demand had to be met through imports. 132 
II. WORLD MONETARY SITUATION 
The two foremost developments in the world monetary forum dur-
ing the last quarter have been direct effects of the commodity shortages 
discussed above, especially that of petroleum. 
A. Background 
In the years following World War II practically the entire non-
Communist world conducted international commerce under a monetary 
system adopted at the Bretton Woods Conference of 1944 and rigidly 
presided over by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Essentially, 
the system provided a means through which central banks could acquire 
foreign currencies required by international traders doing business in 
their countries. Since they and the new system would have been mean-
ingless abstractions without it, each currency was assigned a "par" 
value. This gave it meaning (a) relative to the numeraire, 133 gold, and 
(b) relative to all other participating currencies. 134 Thus, through the 
instrumentality of the par value, international rates of exchange were 
set. Once set, these rates could only be changed through a formal process 
approved by the IMF. This system functioned relatively well for over 
twenty years. Success was due in large measure to the sustained pur-
chasing power of the United States dollar, initially and traditionally the 
system's bulwark currency. For twenty years the dollar continued to 
closely approximate the purchasing power of that quantity of gold to 
which the system said a bearer was entitled in exchange for his dollar. 
However, by 1968 the dollar had suffered so badly from a series of 
130. The Soviet Union does not release statistics on gold production or sales. 
131. INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb. 1974, at 39, 40. 
132. Id. 
133. The numeraire of a monetary system is the common unit of account in terms of 
which the relative value of all currencies is measured. Annual Report of the Council of 
Economic Advisors, 1974, from an excerpt reprinted in IMF SURVEY, Feb. 18, 1974, at 57. 
134. This is so since each, by virtue of its par with gold, partakes of a common 
evaluator. 
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balance of payments deficits that this critical equilibrium ceased to 
exist. The purchasing power of the gold used to back the dollar and the 
whole international system had become markedly greater than the pur-
chasing power of what the system said was an equivalent quantum of 
dollars. 
In an attempt to put an end to speculation against the dollar and 
restore confidence in the established rates of exchange, a group of the 
West's leading trading nations agreed in March of 1968 to cease buying 
and selling gold on the private market. That is, they agreed to cease 
buying and selling gold for any amount other than the officially estab-
lished price, which at that time was $35 per ounce. In so doing they 
created a two-tiered international gold market: gold I (official), and gold 
II (private). This agreement is still in force. 135 It did not, however bring 
about the long-range stabilization which its creators had intended. As 
illustrated in the sections above, the current price of private gold is 
approximately four times the $42.22 price of official gold. 
By the early 1970's the Bretton Woods fixed-rate system had so 
thoroughly ceased reflecting monetary reality that a general adjustment 
in exchange rates was necessitated. Accordingly, in what has come to 
be known as the Smithsonian Agreement, 136 new par values for the dollar 
and other currencies were established in December, 1971. The effect was 
to lower the value of the dollar by 8.5 percent. However, this proved 
insufficient, as did the formal ten percent devaluation of February of 
last year. The speculative run against the dollar continued and 
prompted the decision by major nations to abandon the par value sys-
tem and allow their currencies to find their own levels through the 
operation of market factors and varying degrees of central bank inter-
vention.137 By March 1973 this free market or float system had become 
the new standard. However, there was strong sentiment among many 
members of the IMF for the development of a somewhat firmer ap-
proach toward currency valuation. Accordingly, a special Committee on 
Reform of the International Monetary System, or the Committee of 20, 
began slow but steady progress in September 1972 toward fashioning a 
new structure, the nucleus of which would be a new set of exchange 
rates. Ideally they would be more flexible than those promulgated at 
Bretton Woods but less so than with the float. 138 
135. While the agreement remains, the value of gold under the agreement has offi-
cially changed twice: once to $38 and then to $42.22. 
136. So named because the conference used the buildings of the Smithsonian Insti-
tute in Washington, D.C. 
137. It must be realized that all central banks do intervene in the workings of the 
international monetary system. They cannot help doing so as they trade for the currencies 
which businessmen in the home country require. The real question is to what degree do 
they do it and how they carry it out. See note 138 infra. 
138. Since the spring of 1973 some countries have permitted their currencies to float 
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It was upon this free-floating monetary world, with gold trading 
limited by agreement to the official price of $42.22, and at this stage of 
development toward a new exchange rate structure, that the current raft 
of commodity shortages descended. 
B. Impact 
The commodity shortages have had a dual effect: they have com-
pletely postponed th0 structural reforms which the Committee of 20 had 
been studying and shifted the Committee's attention towards the for-
mulation of interim guidelines; and, they have exerted sharp pressure 
upon governments to disregard their 1968 agreement to the contrary and 
to sell gold at private market levels, currently in excess of $160 per 
ounce. 
1. CURRENT ACTIVITY OF THE COMMITTEE OF 20 
As indicated above, in September of 1972 the Committee of 20 was 
charged by the IMF with exchange rate reform. The original target 
deadline for the presentation of a comprehensive package was the 
Fund's next annual meeting. But by the time this meeting was convened 
in September of 1973 in Nairobi, the scheme had been only partially 
completed. A new target date was set for the January 1974 meeting of 
the Committee to be held in Rome. One month after the Nairobi confer-
ence the Arab oil embargo, with its attendant production cutbacks and 
price increases, was imposed. By January the effects of this action had 
so disrupted the international monetary picture that reform in the sense 
of more fixed rates of currency convertibility became unrealistic. Ac-
cordingly, the finance ministers of the international trading community 
directed the Committee to realign its initiative. It was instructed to 
prepare two separate documents for presentation at its next meeting to 
within a rather wide range, permitting market factors to establish the exchange rate. 
Central banks intervened only to maintain orderly market conditions. Some countries 
decided to peg their currencies to a major currency such as the dollar, allowing their rates 
of exchange to rise and fall as did the major currency. Seven European countries (Ger-
many, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, Norway and Sweden) kept their 
currencies relatively fixed with respect to each other while floating together with respect 
to other countries. But regardless of what form its floating took almost every country, to 
one degree or another, has intervened. It has done so by buying or selling its own or 
another's currency. The goal was to keep the float within bounds it thought were economi-
cally and politically acceptable. NAT'L J. REP., 1974, at 287. France removed itself from 
the float in late January in a move that proved to be more surprising than significant. 
For many years France has preached monetary self-discipline to other nations and the 
unannounced departure from the snake, as the joint float is known, seemed contradictory 
to its fixed rate philosophy. Actually, however, central bank intervention on France's part 
has kept the de facto devaluation of the franc to a modest 4%. See generally N.Y. Times, 
Jan. 23, 1974, at 45, cols. 6-7; id., Mar. 8, 1974, at 43, col. 6. 
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be held in June 197 4. The first was to include a collection of general 
principles for permanent exchange rate reform, leaving the details for a 
later time. Secondly, the Committee was instructed to give its top prior-
ity to those changes in international monetary rules necessary to cope 
with the immediate effects of the oil situation. 139 
With regard to the second of these matters, the ministers were 
deeply concerned lest the floating system be used by any country to gain 
an unfair advantage in international trade. This was, and remains, a 
real possibility, at least theoretically. Since the higher price of oil will 
cause sharply higher outflows of currency from all industrialized coun-
tries this year there will be a concomitant need to increase revenue so 
as to meet this expense, There are a number of means which a govern-
ment could pursue in attempts to achieve this increased inflow. One of 
the more seductive among them involves certain central bank manipu-
lations which bring about what has come to be known as "dirty" float-
ing. 
One certain means of increasing revenue is to increase exports and 
one certain means of increasing exports is to lower the price of domesti-
cally produced goods. This makes them more affordable in the eyes of 
foreign buyers. Sales rise and receipts follow. The valuation of the cur-
rency is the key. 
Since the exchange rates, or relative values, of currencies are pres-
ently determined by market factors, and since the market can be af-
fected by central bank operations, it is within the power of a government 
to raise or lower the value of its currency at any given time. By buying 
its currency on the open market it restricts its supply, making it harder 
to acquire and of greater value. Conversely, by selling its currency in 
great quantity, a government has the capability of driving its value 
down. The result is that foreign buyers will more easily acquire the 
amount of currency necessary to do business with exporters in the coun-
try conducting the "dirty" float. As indicated above, export revenues 
will rise and the country's current accounts index will come closer to 
balancing, despite the increased cost of imported oil. 
To date there has been no indication that any country is prepared 
to precipitate the round of competitive devaluations which would be the 
inevitable consequence of a genuinely "dirty" float. 140 On the contrary, 
there has been evidence that countries are currently quite self-conscious 
about currency slides. 141 Indications are that they intend to intervene in 
139. NAT'L. J. REP., 1974, at 287. 
140. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1974, at 53, col. 5; IMF SURVEY, Jan. 7, 1974, 
at 7. col. 1. 
141. Witness the French in late January intervening to maintain a relatively high 
value for its franc. 
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such a fashion as to maintain the integrity of the system, within bounds 
which are somewhat 142 nebulous and subject to change without notice. 143 
Thus, the danger of a "dirty" float and a rush of competitive devalua-
tions still exists and the Committee of 20 is currently at work on guide-
lines which will determine the outer limits of permissible central bank 
activity. 144 
2. THE QUESTION OF RESERVE Gow VALUATION 
The second of the two outstanding pressures which has been exerted 
upon the international monetary system by the effects of the oil shortage 
is the pressure to officially recognize the private market valuation of 
gold. If governments were to do so, they would automatically increase 
the value of their reserves by a factor of four .145 There is a certain charm 
associated with this. Not only would it create vast new reserves by 
simple fiat, but it would also parallel the fourfold increase in the price 
of crude. 
The United States is opposed to such action, favoring a diminished 
role for gold in the monetary activity of the international community.146 
Instead, the United States advocates an increased reliance upon Special 
Drawing Rights (SDR's), or "paper gold," 147 to provide the increased 
liquidity which will be needed to finance the purchase of oil in the 
months to come. 
The question before the international community, then, is whether 
the system which has been fashioned over the past thirty years will rise 
to the challenges occasioned by economic shortage, or if instead, it will 
142. "Somewhat" is used here advisedly since past performance indicates that cer-
tain limits are significant for psychological reasons. 
143. Rather than in depth consultation or even arm's length negotiation, the vogue 
with respect to currency moves has been a diplomatic notification to friendly governments 
just prior to public announcement. 
144 .... or inactivity. 
145. $42.22 x 4 = $168.88. The current price of gold in the world's bullion markets is 
in the $160 to $165 range. 
146. See note 139 supra. See also INT'L CURRENCY REv., Jan./Feb., 1974, at 43. 
147. In recent months there has been considerable discussion aimed at the establish-
ment of a new system of valuation for the SDR. The Ministers of the Committee of 20 
decided at their January meeting in Rome on a solution to be applied at least for the 
interim period. This solution will involve setting the SDR equal in value to a "basket" of 
leading currencies. An SDR will have the same value, in terms of any currency, as would 
a basket consisting of a certain number of U.S. cents, plus a certain number of German 
pfennige, plus a: certain number of U.K. new pence, and so on. The result will be that, as 
currencies float up and down against one another, the value of the SDR will remain in 
the center; it will appreciate in terms of weak currencies that float down, and depreciate 
against strong currencies that move up. By definition the SDR will remain constant in 
terms of the whole group of currencies composing the basket. IMF SURVEY, Feb. 4, 1974, 
at 40. 
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prove more effective to rely upon the "barbarous relic" of gold which has 
demonstrated undaunted tenacity as the medium of exchange par 
excellence for the past 6,000 years. 
OUTLOOK 
To observe that the trading world is currently experiencing a period 
of distinct shortage is perhaps to belabor the obvious. But to speak of 
'"shortage" is to deal in abstraction; and as with all abstractions, short-
age must be seen as a relative concept. Stripped of its emotional patina 
shortage really designates a condition characterized by total supply 
being insufficient to keep prices as low as they have traditionally been. 
However, the classic resolution of the problem should be the higher 
prices themselves. These should attract greater production initiatives, 
hence greater supply and ultimately lower prices. As is often said, the 
greatest cure for higher prices is higher prices. There is every reason to 
believe that this scenario will be followed in an almost instinctive reac-
tion to the profit motive. However, this reaction is not of the knee-jerk 
variety. The realization of increased commodity supply requires a lead 
time measured not in months, but years. 
Unlike a shortage in manufactured products, the shortage of pri-
mary goods is far less easily overcome. Most manufacturers have spare 
industrial capacity; they normally utilize less than 100 percent of their 
plant, and workers generally work less than full overtime. In times of 
increased demand this reservoir can be tapped to increase supply. How-
ever, such elasticity exists to a far lesser extent in the production process 
of primary goods. In the case of minerals and fossil fuels, mines and bore 
holes must be sunk; in the case of food, current grain supplies must be 
diverted from consumption to increased cattle feed and seed. This re-
sults in the greater supply of metals, petroleum, meat and grain but 
requires time and contributes to still higher interim prices. Lastly, since 
primary goods are by definition nearly impossible to dispense with, 
bidding for the remaining stocks will likely result in price increases far 
surpassing the actual shortage. In other words, a ten percent supply 
shortfall will likely result in a twenty-five percent price increase before 
a sufficient number of would-be buyers are finally shocked into with-
drawing from the bidding war. 
Thus, the outlook for the next several months is for continued com-
modity shortfall and higher prices-what has come to be known as eco-
nomic dislocation. These will be reflected in the decisions of the busi-
ness community, and as such, will continue to have a significant impact 
upon international commerce and the raison d'etre of international com-
mercial law. 
Robert B. Huguet 
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